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ABSTRACT—Highly hypnotizable participants were given a
posthypnotic suggestion to feel a ﬂash of disgust whenever
theyreadanarbitraryword.Theywerethenaskedtorate
moral transgressions described in vignettes that either did
or did not include the disgust-inducing word. Two studies
showthatmoraljudgmentscanbemademoreseverebythe
presence of a ﬂash of disgust. These ﬁndings suggest that
moral judgments may be grounded in affectively laden
moral intuitions.
Morality is often thought to come from a revered source—from
Godorreason.Butmightmorality begroundedmore inthebody
than in the soul? An enormous experimental literature suggests
that people use their bodily reactions as guides when forming
judgments (e.g., moods—Schwarz & Clore, 1983; physiological
arousal—Dutton & Aron, 1974; Schachter & Singer, 1962;
Zillman,1978).Wesoughttotestwhetheranarbitrarilyinduced
gut-level response (disgust) would be used as information for
moral judgment, as predicted by the social intuitionist model of
moral judgment (Haidt, 2001) and the somatic-marker hypoth-
esis (Damasio, 1994).
It is difﬁcult to manipulate moral intuitions directly without
altering any fact about the action being judged, but hypnosis
offers this level of control. Despite a controversial history, hyp-
nosishasbeenusedeffectivelytoinducemood(Bower,Gilligan,
& Monteiro, 1981; MacCallum, McConkey, Bryant, & Barnier,
2000), inhibit emotional responses (Bryant & Kourch, 2001),
and modulate the neural correlates of cognitive processes
(e.g., color perception—Kosslyn, Thompson, Costantini-Fer-
rando, Alpert, & Spiegel, 2000; Stroop interference—Raz,
Shapiro, Fan, & Posner, 2002; and the experience of pain—
Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997). We took
advantageoftherecentlyvalidatedpowerofhypnosistoimplant
posthypnoticsuggestionstofeeldisgustinresponsetooneoftwo
arbitrary words. We then embedded these words into different
moral-judgment vignettes. We predicted that the brief ﬂash of
disgust induced by the posthypnotic suggestion would be in-
terpreted by participants as a kind of information, specifically,
as an intuition that the action in question was morally wrong.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Sixty-four highly hypnotizable participants (19 male) took part
in small group-hypnosis sessions
1 that included a posthypnotic
suggestiontoexperience‘‘abriefpang ofdisgust. . .a sickening
feeling in your stomach’’ when reading a particular word, but to
havenomemoryforthisinstructionuntilcuedtoremember.Half
of the groups were instructed to feel disgust when reading the
word often; half were instructed to feel disgust when reading the
word take. After participants were brought out of the hypnotic
state, they were given a packet of vignettes, ostensibly as part of
an unrelated study.
Each vignette described a moral transgression and was fol-
lowed by two rating scales, one for rating ‘‘how morally wrong’’
and the second for rating ‘‘how disgusting’’ the behavior was.
Ratings were indicated by making a slash mark along a 14-cm
line anchored by the endpoints not at all morally wrong and
extremely morally wrong or not at all disgusting and extremely
disgusting. Slash marks were later converted to a scale from 0
to 100. After making their ratings, participants were asked to
briefly explain their morality ratings.
Six experimental vignettes were designed to test the hypoth-
esis that disgust contributes to moral judgment. These vignettes
wereabout secondcousinswhohadasexualrelationship,aman
whoatehisalreadydeaddog,acongressmanwhotookbribes,an
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ambulance-chasing lawyer, a shoplifter, and a student who stole
library books. Each vignette was written in two versions that
differed by a few words but were semantically identical; one
versionincludedthewordtake,andtheotherthewordoften.For
example, the bribery vignette read as follows:
Congressman Arnold Paxton frequently gives speeches con-
demning corruption and arguing for campaign ﬁnance reform. But
heisjusttryingtocoverupthefactthathehimself[willtakebribes
from/is often bribed by] the tobacco lobby, and other special in-
terests, to promote their legislation.
Half of the participants read three experimental vignettes in
the take version, followed by three buffer vignettes that were
about non-disgust-related infractions (e.g., speeding) and in-
cluded neither hypnotic word, followed by three experimental
vignettes in the often version. The remaining participants read
threeoftenvignettes,followedbythreebuffervignettes,followed
by three take vignettes. The ordering of vignettes was ran-
domized across participants and condition (take vs. often).
After all participants had completed their ratings, the ex-
perimenter announced that they would be offered cookies be-
cause the session was conducted over the dinner hour. Two
research assistants, blind to the hypotheses and to the hypnotic
word used, entered carrying bags of cookies and offered them to
each participant while saying, ‘‘Would you like to take a cook-
ie?’’ and ‘‘Take as many as you want.’’ We predicted that disgust
would inhibit appetite for participants in the take condition.
Finally, participants were given 4 min to recall everything
they could from the hypnosis session and to write this infor-
mation down. They were then given the cue to remember and 2
mintowritedownanythingtheyhadnotrememberedpreviously.
Participantswerethoroughlydebriefedandbrieflyrehypnotized
to eliminate the posthypnotic suggestion.
Results
All 64 participants passed at least two of the three tests of
hypnotic depth, indicating that they were in a hypnotic state
during the posthypnotic suggestion. Forty-ﬁve participants (11
male) were amnesic for the instructions until cued to remember
at the end of the experiment. We limited our analyses to these
participants, as their lack of conscious memory for the true
cause of their disgust affords the most stringent test of whether
disgust informs moral judgment. The cookie task provided a
rough indication of the suggestion’s effectiveness: Participants
inthetakeconditiontooksignificantlyfewercookies(M50.53)
thanparticipantsintheoftencondition(M51.16),t(38)52.86,
p < .01, r 5 .42 (Rosenthal, 1991).
2
The main results are presented in Table 1. For each partici-
pant, we calculated the average of the disgust ratings for the
three stories that included the hypnotic disgust word and the
average of the disgust ratings for the three stories with no hyp-
notic disgust word. As predicted, participants rated the vi-
gnettes as more disgusting when the hypnotic disgust word was
present (M 5 68.0) than when the word was absent (M 5 43.1),
t(44) 5 5.78, p < .001, r 5 .66. More important, participants
rated vignettes as being more morally wrong when the hypnotic
disgust word was present (M 5 73.9) than when the word was
absent (M 5 64.7), t(44) 5 2.41, p < .05, r 5 .34.
Discussion
Participants found moral transgressions to be more disgusting
when their hypnotic disgust word was embedded within the vi-
gnettes than when this word was absent. Moreover, the disgust
word caused participants to rate transgressions as more morally
wrong. Apparently, participants used their feelings of disgust
(attached only to a word, not to the act in question) as infor-
mation about the wrongness of the act. This ﬁnding indicates
that gut feelings can indeed inﬂuence moral judgments (Dam-
asio, 1994; Haidt, 2001).
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 left a few questions unanswered. First, although
the suggestion to ‘‘feel a sickening feeling’’ made moral judg-
ments more severe, it is possible that a negative affective state
TABLE 1
Mean Disgust and Morality Ratings by Hypnotic Disgust Condition, Experiment 1
Vignette
Disgust ratings Morality ratings
Hypnotic disgust present Hypnotic disgust absent Hypnotic disgust present Hypnotic disgust absent
Cousin incest 72.46 43.24nn 67.63 43.29nn
Eating one’s dog 89.22 83.55 65.26 65.64
Bribery 72.37 38.92nn 91.28 78.73n
Lawyer 62.04 48.55 73.26 59.82
Shoplifting 58.38 19.79nnn 79.81 67.75
Library theft 54.68 25.95nn 71.24 69.40
Mean 68.04 43.11nnn 73.94 64.67n
np < .05, nnp < .01, nnnp < .001, by paired-samples t test.
2Participants were asked at the end of the experiment to write down the
number of cookies they took; 5 participants did not.
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would make any rating more negative. To address this possi-
bility, we asked participants in Experiment 2 to make a third
rating for each vignette; these ratings related to the stories but
not the transgressions (e.g., after the shoplifting story: ‘‘How
muchdoyouapprove/disapproveofindoorshoppingmalls?’’).If
the results in Experiment 1 were due to the hypnotic word
creating a generally negative or unpleasant state, such a state
would be expected to bias these ratings as well. Additional
improvements included a more sensitive manipulation check
andtheinclusionofanewstorytotestthelimitingcaseinwhich
disgust is induced in the absence of any possible moral viola-
tion. We predicted that in this case, participants would override
their gut feelings and would not allow their moral judgments to
be affected.
Method
Ninety-four highly hypnotizable participants (37 males) took
part in hypnosis sessions conducted identically to those in Ex-
periment 1. The vignettes and rating scales were identical to
thoseinExperiment1withthefollowingchanges.First,thestory
about a man eating his dead dog was replaced by a story less
likelytoyieldadisgustceilingeffect:astoryaboutawomanwho
littered. Second, the ‘‘Student Council’’ story was added to
provide a story with no violation of any kind: ‘‘Dan is a student
council representative at his school. This semester he is in
charge of scheduling discussions about academic issues. He
[tries to take/often picks] topics that appeal to both professors
and students in order to stimulate discussion.’’ Third, after
rating each transgression for moral wrongness and disgust,
participants rated how much they approved or disapproved of
something related to the story, but not the transgression itself.
Followingthevignettes,participantsﬁlledoutamanipulation
check: a one-page questionnaire asking them to rate (on a scale
from1to7)howmuchtheywouldliketodo12activities.Fourof
the items contained the word take (e.g., ‘‘take a neighbor’s child
toseeHarryPotter’’),4containedthewordoften(e.g.,‘‘spendan
evening in a coffee shop that often has live music’’), and 4
contained neither take nor often.
Results
Sixty-three participants (26 male) were amnesic for the in-
structions and passed two or all three tests of hypnotic depth.
There were no significant sex differences on any comparisons of
interest. The manipulation check showed that the same activi-
ties were rated as less liked by participants who had been
hypnotized to feel disgust in response to a word included in the
descriptions (M 5 4.7) than by participants who had been
hypnotizedtofeeldisgustinresponsetoanotherword(M55.4),
t(62) 5 4.02, p < .001, r 5 .45. This ﬁnding suggests that the
manipulation endured to the end of the experiment and that the
disgustreactionswerebriefandconﬁnedtotheitemscontaining
the disgust word (i.e., the disgust did not bleed over to affect
judgments of subsequent items). For each participant, we cal-
culated a hypnotic-bias score by subtracting the average liking
for activities that included the hypnotic disgust word from the
averagelikingforactivitiesthatincludedtheotherword.Forany
given participant, we could not be sure that a positive score
indicated that the posthypnotic suggestion was effective, but on
average we expected larger main effects from participants with
larger hypnotic-bias scores.
The main results are shown in Table 2. Participants judged
actions to be more disgusting when their hypnotic word was
present (M 5 60.0)than when it was absent (M5 50.7), t(62) 5
3.04, p < .005, r 5 .36. For the morality ratings, there were
substantially more outliers (in both directions) than in Experi-
ment 1 or for the other ratings in this experiment. As the paired-
samplesttestlosespowerinthepresenceofoutliers,weusedits
nonparametric analogue, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, as well
(Hollander&Wolfe,1999).Participantsjudgedtheactionstobe
more morallywrong whentheir hypnoticword was present (M5
73.4)thanwhenitwasabsent(M569.6),t(62)51.74,p5.09;
Wilcoxon Z 5 2.18, p < .05, r 5 .27. Participants were not
significantly more approving of non-transgression-related items
(e.g., shopping malls) when the hypnotic word was present
(M 5 45.6) than when it was absent (M 5 42.1), t(62) 5 1.23,
n.s., r 5 .15.
Intheabsenceofthehypnoticword,theStudentCouncilstory
wasratedasnotatalldisgusting(M52.3)andnotatallmorally
TABLE 2
Mean Disgust and Morality Ratings by Hypnotic Disgust Condition, Experiment 2
Vignette
Disgust ratings Morality ratings
Hypnotic disgust present Hypnotic disgust absent Hypnotic disgust present Hypnotic disgust absent
Cousin incest 81.18 71.07 72.53 62.72
Littering 64.18 62.83 67.64 64.71
Bribery 63.19 51.88 83.86 78.88
Lawyer 62.60 60.88 75.37 70.39
Shoplifting 40.41 34.16 74.34 73.06
Library theft 46.34 25.65n 66.14 69.53
Mean 60.04 50.72nn 73.42 69.62
+
np < .05, nnp < .01, by paired-samples t test.
+p < .05 by Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
782 Volume 16—Number 10
Hypnotic Disgust and Moral Judgment
(
B
W
U
S
 
P
S
C
I
 
1
6
1
4
.
P
D
F
 
1
0
-
A
u
g
-
0
5
 
1
7
:
4
3
 
8
1
3
9
8
 
B
y
t
e
s
 
5
 
P
A
G
E
S
 
n
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
=
B
.
M
.
P
r
a
k
a
s
h
)
PSCI  1614UNCORRECTED PROOF
wrong (M 5 2.7). The presence of the hypnotic word, however,
elevated ratings of disgust (M 5 20.9), t(61) 5 3.73, p 5 .001, r
5.43,andmoral wrongness(M514.0),t(61)53.32,p<.005,
r 5 .39. The effects of hypnotic disgust were limited to Dan’s
action and did not increase disapproval of university tuition
rates (the non-transgression-related rating), t(61) 5 1.53, n.s.,
r 5 .19.
Hypnotic-bias scores, which were rough indications of the
‘‘dosage’’ of hypnosis participants had received, predicted the
‘‘response’’ shown by their judgments. For both disgust and
morality ratings, hypnotic-bias scores correlated with the dif-
ference between participants’ average rating when the hypnotic
word waspresent and average rating when it wasabsent: disgust
r(63) 5 .35, p < .01; morality r(63) 5 .27, p < .05. However,
for non-transgression-related ratings, there was no correlation,
r(63) 5 .09, n.s.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two studies, participants listened to their gut feelings of
disgust when judging moral transgressions. It is important to
notethatwedidnothypnotizeparticipantstofeeldisgusttoward
the actions in question. Rather, we hypnotized participants to
feel a ﬂash of disgust whenever they saw an arbitrary word, and
this ﬂash, in the context of a surrounding story, made moral
judgmentsofthe story more severe.Study 2foundthatthe effect
was specific to the act being judged; it did not affect unrelated
judgments made immediately afterward. And contrary to pre-
dicted limitations of this effect, some participants continued to
follow their gut feelings and condemned Dan in the Student
Council story, even though his only crime was trying to foster
good discussions.
Participants sometimes experienced puzzlement as they
watched themselves make severe judgments. Asked for com-
ments at the end of the study, one participant wrote: ‘‘When
‘often’appearedIfeltconfusedinmyhead,yettherewasturmoil
in my stomach. It was as if something was telling me that there
was a problem with the story yet I didn’t know why.’’ One non-
amnesic participant commented: ‘‘I knew about ‘the word’ but it
still disgusted me anyway and affected my ratings. I would
wonder why and then make up a reason to be disgusted.’’
The post hoc nature ofmoral reasoning was most dramatically
illustrated by the Student Council story. Rather than overrule
their feelings about Dan, some participants launched an even
moredesperatesearchforexternaljustiﬁcation.Oneparticipant
wrote: ‘‘It just seems like he’s up to something.’’ Another con-
ﬁded that the story evoked bad high school memories, making
him view Dan as a ‘‘popularity-seeking snob.’’ Even when such
tenuous justiﬁcations could not be found, several participants
clung to their repugnance, choosing to abandon explanation
altogether, writing: ‘‘It just seems so weird and disgusting’’ and
‘‘I don’t know [why it’s wrong], it just is.’’
CONCLUSION
We have provided the ﬁrst demonstration that experimentally
augmenting feelings of disgust through hypnosis can increase
theseverityofmoraljudgments,aspredictedbyDamasio(1994)
and Haidt (2001). We have not yet demonstrated a unique re-
lationship between disgust and morality, because we did not
show that other negative feelings (e.g., sadness, anger, or
headache) do not have the same effects. Nonetheless, our ﬁnd-
ings illustrate the philosopher Hume’s (1739/1969) famous
statement that ‘‘reason is . . . the slave of the passions, and can
pretend to no other ofﬁce than to serve and obey them’’ (p. 462).
In these experiments, we augmented the passions, or created
them from scratch, and in some cases reason struggled valiantly
to serve.
Acknowledgments—We thank Bobbie Spellman, Dan Wegner,
Dan Willingham, Tim Wilson, Mark Zanna, and three reviewers
whose suggestions greatly improved this report. This work was
supported by National Institute on Drug Abuse Grant 1-RO3-
DA12606-01 and by the John Templeton Foundation.
REFERENCES
Bower, G.H., Gilligan, S.G., & Monteiro, K.P. (1981). Selectivity of
learning caused by affective states. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 110, 451–473.
Bryant, R.A., & Kourch, M. (2001). Hypnotically induced emotional
numbing. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Hypnosis, 49, 220–230.
Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human
brain. New York: Putnam.
Dutton, D.G., & Aron, A.P. (1974). Some evidence for heightened
sexual attraction under conditions of high anxiety. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 510–517.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social in-
tuitionist approach tomoral judgment. Psychological Review,108,
814–834.
Hollander, M., & Wolfe, D.A. (1999). Nonparametric statistical meth-
ods. New York: Wiley.
Hume, D. (1969). A treatise of human nature. London: Penguin.
(Original work published 1739)
Kosslyn, S.M., Thompson, W.L., Costantini-Ferrando, M.F., Alpert,
N.M., & Spiegel, D. (2000). Hypnotic visual illusion alters color
processing in the brain. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157,
1279–1284.
MacCallum, F., McConkey, K.M., Bryant, R.A., & Barnier, A.J. (2000).
Specificautobiographicalmemoryfollowinghypnoticallyinduced
mood state. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Hypnosis, 48, 361–373.
Rainville, P., Duncan, G.H., Price, D.D., Carrier, B., & Bushnell, M.C.
(1997). Pain affect encoded in human anterior cingulate but not
somatosensory cortex. Science, 277, 968–971.
Raz,A.,Shapiro,T.,Fan,J.,&Posner,M.J.(2002).Hypnoticsuggestion
and the modulation of Stroop interference. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 59, 1155–1161.
Volume 16—Number 10 783
Thalia Wheatley and Jonathan Haidt
(
B
W
U
S
 
P
S
C
I
 
1
6
1
4
.
P
D
F
 
1
0
-
A
u
g
-
0
5
 
1
7
:
4
3
 
8
1
3
9
8
 
B
y
t
e
s
 
5
 
P
A
G
E
S
 
n
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
=
B
.
M
.
P
r
a
k
a
s
h
)
PSCI  1614UNCORRECTED PROOF
Rosenthal, R. (1991). Meta-analytic procedures for social research.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Schachter, S., & Singer, J.E. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiolog-
ical determinants of emotional state. Psychological Review, 69,
379–399.
Schwarz,N.,&Clore,G.L.(1983).Mood,misattribution,andjudgments
of well-being: Information and directive functions of affective
states.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,45,513–523.
Shor, R.E., & Orne, E.C. (1962). Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic
Susceptibility, Form A. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists
Press.
Zillman, D. (1978). Attribution and misattribution of excitatory reac-
tions. In J.H. Harvey, W.J. Ickes, & R.F. Kidd (Eds.), New direc-
tions in attribution research (Vol. 2, pp. 335–362). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
(RECEIVED 6/4/04; REVISION ACCEPTED 4/21/05;
FINAL MATERIALS RECEIVED 5/3/05)
784 Volume 16—Number 10
Hypnotic Disgust and Moral Judgment
(
B
W
U
S
 
P
S
C
I
 
1
6
1
4
.
P
D
F
 
1
0
-
A
u
g
-
0
5
 
1
7
:
4
3
 
8
1
3
9
8
 
B
y
t
e
s
 
5
 
P
A
G
E
S
 
n
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
=
B
.
M
.
P
r
a
k
a
s
h
)
PSCI  1614